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ABSTRACT
In an apparent international ﬁrst, the High Court has allowed a terminally ill 14-year-
old to be cryopreserved after her death. The patient, JS, requested this, as she hoped
one day to be reanimated and cured. Jackson J focused on the welfare (or best interests)
of JS as she approached the end of her life and particularly on her (apparently) compe-
tent wish to be cryopreserved. I consider the interests involved in a decision to undergo
cryonics, speciﬁcally exploring which interests and whose interests are engaged. Starting
with autonomy interests, the judgment implicitly supported a relational account of
autonomy, but was dominated by a subjective interpretation of autonomy, which
prioritized JS’s wishes. Questions nevertheless arise about whether the dying person is
entitled to legislate for the reanimated person he or she might become. Temporal con-
cerns also feature when we interpret welfare in terms of happiness, because the dying
person and the (potential) future reanimated person might have different interests at
different times. Finally, I widen the analysis to accommodate the interests of others, by
exploring whether cryonics is in, or contrary to, the public interest. Utilizing different
accounts of the public interest, I argue that the case for cryonics is not entirely made
out. These observations on autonomy, happiness and the public interest combine to
suggest that, although there may not be a decisive case for denying a wish like JS’s,
there is a case for caution, at least while we seek to clarify and resolve the different
interests in issue.
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I . INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to explain why I want this unusual thing done. I’m only
14 years old and I don’t want to die, but I know I am going to. I think being
cryo-preserved gives me a chance to be cured and woken up, even in hundreds
of years’ time. I don’t want to be buried underground. I want to live and live lon-
ger and I think that in the future they might ﬁnd a cure for my cancer and wake
me up. I want to have this chance. This is my wish.1
These are the words of JS, a terminally ill 14-year-old who sought—and obtained—
approval from the High Court to have her body cryopreserved after her death, in the
hope that she might one day be reanimated. This was apparently the ﬁrst time
that any court, internationally, has been asked to approve such a request.2
Cryopreservation and reanimation of various tissues is already possible,3 but reanima-
tion of the sort sought by JS is not (yet?) possible. This type of cryopreservation is
known as ‘cryonics’,4 a term ﬁrst used in the mid-1960s, around which time the cryo-
preservation of cadavers also began.5 The movement was spearheaded by American
physicist Robert Ettinger, whose book The Prospect of Immortality was initially pub-
lished in 1962.6
There currently appear to be ﬁve organizations that provide a cryonics service: the
Cryonics Institute,7 to which JS’s body was reportedly transferred,8 Alcor,9 Oregon
Cryonics,10 Trans Times,11 and KrioRus.12 The ﬁrst four of these are based in the
USA, the latter is based in Russia, and a new company plans to open a facility in
Australia in 2017.13 There are also various organizations worldwide dedicated to the
cryonic cause,14 including research groups, organizations that help to facilitate cryo-
preservation, and, in the case of the Society for Venturism, a church, whose members
1 Re JS (Disposal of Body) [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam), [10].
2 Ibid [23].
3 Eg Jackson J refers to ‘the preservation of sperm and embryos as part of fertility treatment’: Re JS (n 1) [7].
4 Like the judge, I will use ‘cryopreservation’ and ‘cryonics’ interchangeably to refer to what JS sought (he
also occasionally conﬂates the two, referring to ‘cryonic preservation’ eg Re JS (n 1) [8]).
5 DR Spector, ‘Legal Implications of Cryonics’ (1969) 18 Clev-Marshall L Rev 341.
6 The Immortalist Society, ‘Brief Biography of Robert CW Ettinger’ <http://immortalistsociety.org/robert_
ettinger_bio.htm> accessed 5 December 2016. For further detail on the history of the movement, see: AA
Perlin, ‘“To Die in Order to Live”: The Need for Legislation Governing Postmortem Cryonic Suspension’
(2007–2008) 36 Sw UL Rev 33.
7 Cryonics Institute<http://www.cryonics.org/> accessed 2 December 2016.
8 G Raynder, L Finnigan and H Bodkin, ‘Girl, 14, who died of Cancer Cryogenically Frozen after Telling
Judge she wanted to be brought back to life “in Hundreds of Years”’ The Telegraph (London, 18
November 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/18/cancer-girl-14-is-cryogenically-frozen-
after-telling-judge-she-w/> accessed 2 December 2016.
9 ALCOR<https://www.alcor.org/> accessed 2 December 2016.
10 Oregon Cryonics<http://www.oregoncryo.com/index.html> accessed 2 December 2016.
11 Trans Time<http://www.transtime.com/index.html> accessed 2 December 2016.
12 KrioRus<http://www.kriorus.com/en/> accessed 2 December 2016.
13 Statis Systems Australia <http://www.stasissystemsaustralia.com/project.html> accessed 2 December
2016.
14 HþPedia, ‘Cryonics Organisations’ <https://hpluspedia.org/wiki/Category:Cryonics_organisations>
accessed 5 December 2016.
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‘believe that we have a religious right to object to autopsy, which would interfere with
our ability to go into cryopreservation in a timely fashion upon our legal deaths’.15
Cryonics involves cooling the body (or only the head) to very low temperatures.
The Cryonics Institute explains that its procedure has four phases, from pre-
treatment, to initial cool down and transportation, to washout and perfusion, before
further cooling and storage.16 They, like the other companies, outline the costs en-
tailed, explaining that many prospective cryons choose to arrange payment through
life insurance.17 The organizations readily admit that the science of possible reanima-
tion and cure is not yet perfected, with customers merely being ‘afforded the opportu-
nity to be preserved at cryogenic temperatures in hope that future medical technology
may be able to someday revive and restore them to full health’.18
Jackson J recognized that JS’s case invited reﬂection on a ‘speculative and contro-
versial’19 procedure, but he focused his decision on JS’s current welfare and, in partic-
ular, her wishes. This was a difﬁcult decision, humanely decided.20 In this article, I will
nevertheless critically explore the interests in issue in such a case, with a particular fo-
cus on which interests and whose interests are at stake. Although I will raise more ques-
tions than I answer, I hope to show that there are signiﬁcant challenges associated
with not only balancing the current and future interests of individuals like JS, but also
balancing the interests of JS (at whatever time) against those of the wider community
(again, at whatever time).
I will ﬁrst work through the autonomy interests. Some objective, relational consid-
erations featured in the ruling, but Jackson J essentially followed the dominant legal
line in deploying a subjective account of autonomy, which looked to—and re-
spected—JS’s particular wishes. This appears to be appropriate, but I nevertheless
query whether the dying JS has the authority to legislate for the future JS that
she might become, both as a ‘cryon’,21 and (if her hopes are realized) as a reanimated
individual. Temporal concerns also arise when I analyse JS’s welfare in terms of her
happiness. Here, for example, I explore the potential happiness that might be enjoyed
by a reanimated JS, but consider how this might impose some unhappy costs on her
life—and death—prior to cryopreservation.
I then expand the analysis to include the public interest, and thus the interests of
the community at large. Such considerations also feature in law, although—as was the
case in this ruling—they are not always fully articulated or explicated. Drawing on
15 Society for Venturism, ‘Cryonics Membership’<http://www.venturist.info/cryonics-membership.html>>
accessed 5 December 2016. On the American law pertaining to the protection of this freedom, see: Perlin
(n 6) 41–44.
16 Cryonics Institute, ‘Cryonics Procedures’ <http://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/procedures/> accessed 2
December 2016.
17 Cryonics Institute, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <http://www.cryonics.org/about-us/faqs/> accessed 2
December 2016.
18 Ibid.
19 Re JS (n 1) [7].
20 Participating as a judge in the ‘Ethical Judgments Project’ reinforced for me the challenges of resolving
ethico-legal dilemmas, even in a ﬁctional exercise: SW Smith, J Coggon, C Hobson, R Huxtable, S
McGuinness, J Miola, and M Neal, eds, Ethical Judgments: Re-writing Medical Law (Hart 2016). I also hope
that nothing in this paper contributes further to any distress that JS’s family may be experiencing.
21 GP Smith II, ‘Intimations of Immortality: Clones, Cyrons and the Law’ (1983) 6 UNSW Law J 119, 120.
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different accounts of the public interest, I argue that the case for cryonics is not
entirely made out, as it appears (unjustly) to be the preserve of the wealthy, has an
adverse environmental impact, and risks uncertainty about the deﬁnition of death
(and what follows thereafter). Science should be free to ﬂourish but we might ask
whether, in effectively endorsing JS’s speculative hope, the court in this case has over-
stepped a public interest line. At best, this ruling offered some hope and comfort to a
dying teenager; at worst, it offered false hope to JS and cold comfort, not only to JS,
but perhaps also to the wider society. These observations combine to suggest that
there may not be a decisive case for prohibition and thus the denial of a wish like JS’s,
but there is a case for caution, at least while we seek to clarify and resolve the different
interests in play. Before advancing these arguments, I will set the scene, by outlining
the decision in Re JS.
I I . CRYONICS IN THE COURTROOM
14-year-old JS had been diagnosed with a rare form of cancer in 2015 and, by August
2016, was receiving palliative end-of-life care. Following some months of research, she
formed a wish for cryonics: ‘I want to live and live longer and I think that in the future
they might ﬁnd a cure for my cancer and wake me up. I want to have this chance.
This is my wish.’22 Her mother supported her request and her grandparents secured
the £37,000 needed to cover the procedure. JS’s estranged father (with whom JS had
not had contact since 2008) ultimately agreed to offer no objection, although he
wanted he and his family to be permitted to view JS’s body after her death, to avoid
contact with JS’s mother, and to avoid any ﬁnancial liability.
The High Court was approached to resolve the dispute between JS’s parents and
determine the lawfulness of JS’s wish. Jackson J found that he had the power to
resolve these matters, and he essentially ruled in favour of JS and her mother. As re-
quired by the Children Act 1989, JS’s welfare was Jackson J’s paramount consideration
and, although he evidently felt some discomfort with JS’s choice, for him ‘the predom-
inant features are JS’s wishes and feelings and her acute emotional needs’.23 A speciﬁc
issue order was made under the Children Act 1989, which allowed JS’s mother to con-
tinue to make arrangements for the preservation of JS’s body. Via a prospective order,
she was also made the sole administrator of JS’s estate, with sole authority to make ar-
rangements for the disposal and viewing of JS’s body. JS’s father was assured he would
not be ﬁnancially liable, but he was prevented (by an injunction in personam) from
seeking to administer JS’s estate or otherwise interfering with the arrangements made
by JS’s mother.
The central issues resolved, Jackson J nevertheless appreciated that this was a novel
case involving a ‘speculative and controversial’ science,24 which was not wholly cov-
ered by the existing law, such as is as set down in the Human Tissue Act 2004.
Recognizing that the case might ‘suggest the need for proper regulation of cryonic
preservation in this country if it is to happen in future’,25 he ordered the disclosure of
22 Re JS (n 1) [10].
23 Ibid [46].
24 Ibid [7].
25 Ibid [69].
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papers to the Human Tissue Authority. Initial preservation of JS’s body was report-
edly arranged by Cryonics UK, before it was then transported to the Cryonics
Institute in the USA.26 Sadly, as Jackson J relayed in a post-script, JS’s mother was
said to have been ‘preoccupied with the post-mortem arrangements at the expense of
being fully available to JS’ on her last day, while the voluntary organization was appar-
ently ‘under-equipped and disorganised, resulting in pressure being placed on the hos-
pital to allow procedures that had not been agreed’.27
Jackson J suspected that ‘this application is the only one of its kind to have come
before the courts in this country, and probably anywhere else’.28 Cryonics has made it
into court elsewhere in the past, albeit in rather different circumstances: for example,
in an American case in 1981, a jury awarded ‘$928,594.00 for breach of contract and
fraud regarding a bankrupt cryotorium’s failure to provide the continuous suspension
of two individuals’, while in 1992 a Californian court rejected a plea to allow pre-
mortem cryonic suspension.29 As Jackson J noted, Re JS ‘is an example of the new
questions that science poses to the law, perhaps most of all to family law’.30 In this
case, the dominant consideration from family law was that of the welfare or ‘best inter-
ests’ of JS.31 The Californian court had been similarly alert to the interests of the indi-
vidual, but it notably also considered the wider public interests involved. In what
follows, I seek to explore the different sets of interests engaged, speciﬁcally investigat-
ing which interests and whose interests are in issue in JS’s case. I start with JS’s auton-
omy, which was central to Jackson J’s reasoning.
I I I . IN THE INTERESTS OF JS’S AUTONOMY?
According to the Children Act 1989, JS’s welfare had to be Jackson J’s ‘paramount con-
cern’ when deciding whether or not to grant a speciﬁc issue order that would empower
JS’s mother to make arrangements for JS’s cryopreservation.32 The judge opined that ‘the
predominant features’ of JS’s welfare were ‘JS’s wishes and feelings and her acute emo-
tional needs’.33 Here, Jackson J gestures towards two of the three dominant approaches
to welfare taken in axiology (value theory), which Parﬁt introduces as follows:
What would be best for someone, or would be most in this person’s interests, or
would make this person’s life go, for him, as well as possible? Answers to this
question I call theories about self-interest. There are three kinds of theory. On
Hedonistic Theories, what would be best for someone is what would make his life
happiest. On Desire-Fulﬁlment Theories, what would be best for someone is what,
throughout his life, would best fulﬁl his desires. On Objective List Theories,
26 Raynder et al (n 8).
27 Re JS (n 1) [68].
28 Ibid [23].
29 Smith (n 21) 131; Donaldson v Van de Kamp 4Cal Rptr 2d 59 (Cal Ct App 1992). See also Alcor Life
Extension Foundation, Inc v Mitchell, 9 Cal Rptr 2d 572, 574 (Ct App 1992), regarding cryonics and the law-
ful disposal of bodies. For discussion of other US legal activity around cryonics, see: Perlin (n 6).
30 Re JS (n 1) [23].
31 The terms are synonymous: In Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199, per Lord Hailsham
LC, 202.
32 s 1(1).
33 Re JS (n 1) [46].
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certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we want to have the good
things, or to avoid the bad things.34
When referring to JS’s ‘wishes and feelings’, Jackson J is implicitly appealing to desire-
fulﬁlment theories, which effectively align with accounts of respect for autonomy
(self-rule). Although accounts of autonomy abound, healthcare law appears most in-
clined towards subjective, rather than objective, understandings of the concept.
On a subjective account of autonomy, a person’s decision warrants respect if it
expresses either their ‘current’ (i.e. even ﬂeeting or uncritically held) desires or their
‘best’ desires, where the latter refers to those desires that align with the individual pa-
tient’s value system, whatever those values happen to be.35 On an objective account
of autonomy, only an ‘ideal’ set of desires warrant respect i.e. the person must take a
‘responsible’ decision, which aligns with ‘a purportedly objective system of ideals’.36
On such an account, the content of the person’s decision can be scrutinized: only a
decision with the ‘right’ content should be respected.
Healthcare law generally favours a subjective approach to autonomy, particularly (but
not exclusively) where adult patients are concerned.37 Capacity or competence operates
as a gatekeeper to autonomy: if the patient has capacity in the relevant sense, then his or
her individual decision generally warrants respect.38 In its reports preceding the Mental
Capacity Act 2005, the Law Commission contemplated three broad approaches to capac-
ity: the ‘status’, ‘outcome’, and ‘functional’ approaches.39 ‘Status’-based approaches do fea-
ture in the law, at least in relation to minors: for example, the test of competence that
applies to under-16s differs from that applicable to over-16s,40 and a refusal of treatment
by a competent minor of any age lacks the legal force of a refusal issued by a competent
adult.41 Yet, the law generally favours ‘functional’ approaches to capacity: both adults and
children will have (at least some of) their decisions respected, if they are able to under-
stand the nature and effect of those decisions. An ‘outcome’ approach, meanwhile, ﬁnds
no explicit support in law.42 According to the Law Commission, this approach
focuses on the ﬁnal content of an individual’s decision. Any decision which is
inconsistent with conventional values, or with which the assessor disagrees, may
be classiﬁed as incompetent. This penalises individuality and demands confor-
mity at the expense of personal autonomy.43
34 D Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1984) 493 (emphasis in original).
35 J Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justiﬁable Inconsistency or
Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007) 15 Health Care Anal 235, 241.
36 Ibid.
37 But see ibid.
38 ‘Generally’ because ‘We cannot always have what we want’ (Aintree v James [2013] UKSC 67, per Lady
Hale, [45]).
39 The Law Commission,Mental Incapacity (Law Com No 231, HMSO 1995).
40 Contrast Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 and Mental Capacity Act
2005, ss 2, 3.
41 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11; Re W (A Minor) (Consent to Medical
Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 1.
42 At least, not overtly. See: Coggon (n 35).
43 Law Commission (n 39) [3.4].
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The law’s preference for a functional—rather than an outcome-based or (entirely) sta-
tus-based—approach to capacity indicates that the law generally supports a subjective,
as opposed to an objective, account of patient autonomy. That preference is also in-
creasingly evident in the courts’ dealings with patients who lack or lose capacity: as
Lady Hale noted in Aintree, ‘The purpose of the best interests test is to consider mat-
ters from the patient’s point of view’.44
Given the legal framework, Jackson J unsurprisingly took a subjective approach to
JS’s autonomy. This orientation is evident in his reference to the wishes and feelings
of JS, rather than those of some ‘objective’ other. However, objective considerations
can still be detected in the ruling. We will start with these, before exploring Jackson J’s
subjective approach to JS’s wishes, and then querying whether these wishes should
have proven so inﬂuential.
A. Autonomy as Objective
Although Jackson J essentially took a subjective approach to JS’s autonomy, objective
considerations can be glimpsed in the ruling, and perhaps unsurprisingly so, given the
law’s (aforementioned) reluctance to empower minors to make decisions that might
be contrary to their welfare. The content and outcome of JS’s decision is (to echo the
Law Commission) certainly unconventional and, as Jackson J notes, ‘all the profes-
sionals feel deep unease about it’.45 Jackson J seems to share the doctors’ doubts that
JS is making the ‘right’ decision. He also indicates that he understands JS’s ‘father’s
misgivings’ and emphasizes that ‘The court is not approving or encouraging cryonics,
still less ordering that JS’s body should be cryonically preserved’.46 Like other judges
before him,47 Jackson J appears not to like the patient’s choice—but he nevertheless
conﬁrms that it is indeed her choice and that it merits respect.48
Perhaps, however, Jackson J can be somewhat reassured, since respecting JS’s deci-
sion does at least help to promote one objective good, since it honours the longstand-
ing bond between JS and her mother. Engaging in deep relationships is one of the
objective goods cited in discussions of welfare.49 Autonomy–at least as subjectively
conceived—can appear to be at odds with the maintenance of such relationships.
Indeed, it is striking that English law is further entrenching a subjective account of au-
tonomy, at a time when the concept is coming under increasing attack in bioethics.
Subjective accounts of autonomy are said to be misconceived, over-inﬂated, and ne-
glectful of social values like solidarity.50 As Lanre-Abass puts it:
44 Aintree (n 38) [45].
45 Re JS (n 1) [13].
46 Ibid [38], [30] (emphasis in original).
47 Eg Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449.
48 Re JS (n 1) [46], [31].
49 T Hope, A Slowther and J Eccles, ‘Best Interests, Dementia and the Mental Capacity Act (2005)’ (2009) 35
J Med Ethics 733.
50 Eg R Huxtable, ‘For and Against the Four Principles of Biomedical Ethics’ (2013) 8 Clinical Ethics 39; R
Huxtable and R ter Meulen, eds, The Voices and Rooms of European Bioethics (Routledge 2015); R de Vries,
‘Bioethics in Academic Rooms: Hearing Other Voices, Living in Other Rooms’, in R Huxtable and R ter
Meulen (eds) The Voices and Rooms of European Bioethics (Routledge 2015) 192–206, 205.
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too much stress on autonomy can lead to an isolation of the subject and even
distort people’s understanding of the way individual decisions are embedded in
a web of relationships and familial values. Also, stressing individual autonomy to
the exclusion of other values can do real harm to families.51
But Jackson J’s decision arguably avoids doing such harm: mother and daughter are
united here, as indeed they had been for many years.52 In effect, Jackson J’s ruling ap-
pears to avoid the atomization feared by those who prefer a relational ethic to govern,
and this might be considered objectively worthwhile.
B. Autonomy as Subjective
Jackson J’s ruling is therefore amenable to an objective reading, since it honours the
bond between JS and her mother, but the better reading is that he understood and ap-
plied a subjective account of autonomy. As a ﬁrst step, JS’s competence had to be con-
ﬁrmed. For a 14-year-old like JS, competence is to be assessed by reference to the
decision in Gillick, in which Lord Scarman referred to ‘the child’s right to make his
own decisions when he reaches a sufﬁcient understanding and intelligence to be capa-
ble of making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision’.53 Jackson J con-
ﬁrmed ‘that JS has the capacity to bring this application’,54 elsewhere stating ‘that JS is
a child, albeit a legally competent one’.55 Although questions arise here,56 Jackson J
makes clear that he believes JS to have the requisite functional competence:
She is described by her experienced solicitor as a bright, intelligent young person
who is able to articulate strongly held views on her current situation. Her social
worker says that she has pursued her investigations with determination, even
though a number of people have tried to dissuade her, and that she has not been
coerced or steered by her family or anyone else.57
In addition to indicating her competence, these observations imply that JS’s decision
is one that she would endorse on reﬂection, as it is consistent with her values – in
51 B Lanre-Abass, ‘Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Research Ethics’ (2012) 4 Health 173,
175.
52 Jackson J refers to JS’s ‘dependence on her mother’ (Re JS (n 1) [36]). But see further Section IV, regarding
the unfortunate circumstances at the time of JS’s demise.
53 Gillick (n 40) per Lord Scarman, 186.
54 Re JS (n 1) [9].
55 Ibid [25].
56 First, does JS have the competence or capacity to make the decision for cryonics? Jackson J refers to her
having ‘the capacity to bring this application’, but capacity and competence are decision-speciﬁc: better,
then, to state that she has the capacity or competence to decide to undergo cryopreservation. Secondly, is
Jackson J using ‘competence’ and ‘capacity’ interchangeably and, if so, is that appropriate? He is not the ﬁrst
judge apparently to do so (eg Gillick (n 40)) but ‘competence’, which is determined on the basis of the test
articulated in Gillick (n 40), applies to those under 16 years of age, while ‘capacity’, which is determined on
the basis of the test articulated in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, might best be reserved for those of 16 years
and over (see: E Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and Resolving Problems with the Concept of Child
Competence’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 103, 104–105). If this distinction applies, then as JS was 14 years old
at the relevant time, the 2005 Act’s terminology might best be avoided.
57 Re JS (n 1) [9].
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other words, with her (subjective) ‘best’ desires, as opposed to merely her ‘current’
desires.
However, at least two objections can be levelled at the idea that JS’s decision artic-
ulates her best desires – although both objections can be met. First, there is the prob-
lem of timing. We are told that JS pursued her investigations ‘over recent months’,58
and hence during the period that she was dying, with all the anguish and suffering
that this might sadly have entailed. There is also her young age to consider: can a
14-year-old form and hold the relevant ‘best’ desires? In answer to this objection,
however, we should accept not only that adults’ values can change,59 but also that
there is evidence to suggest that young people–particularly those who endure long-
standing or terminal illness – can form autonomous treatment preferences.60
Secondly, there is the problem of information. Jackson J seemed satisﬁed that JS
had the ‘sufﬁcient understanding and intelligence’ to which Lord Scarman referred.
But understanding requires information. How can JS have been sufﬁciently informed?
Presumably JS’s research revealed what is known about cryonics, in terms of its me-
chanics, costs, and the fact that the science cannot yet deliver on its potential promises
of a future cure and reanimation.61 But cryonics also involves known unknowns (and,
no doubt, unknown unknowns). If the procedure does ultimately deliver, then what
future can JS anticipate?
In response to these queries, we should ﬁrst accept that such questions can be
asked of any and every decision to undergo cryopreservation, whatever the age or
health of the potential cryon. Moreover, they might well be asked of any and every de-
cision ever contemplated, by anyone. In short, it is impossible for anyone to be fully
informed about any decision: one can only know what a decision entails after having
taken that decision. And every decision is irreversible, if only in temporal terms: one
cannot time-travel back to the point of decision, in order to take a different decision.62
Absolute informedness is impossible to attain, and if we were to raise the bar on the
level of information that is required before a decision can be considered autonomous,
we are likely to ﬁnd ourselves deprived of numerous opportunities to decide. The law
already permits people to, in effect, choose death, through the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment.63 For many, death is unknowable: one might be informed about what con-
tinued life is likely to involve, but one cannot be similarly informed about death.
Despite this, the law protects these choices, and ﬁnds that they can be autonomously
made. What Jackson J achieves is therefore arguably consistent with this position: JS
had the relevant available information, and the necessary intelligence, so her choice
should similarly be respected.
58 Ibid [6].
59 See eg HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408.
60 Eg DR Freyer, ‘Care of the Dying Adolescent: Special Considerations’ (2004) 113 Pediatrics 381.
61 The latter point was reiterated by Alcor, in a press release following the ruling: Alcor, ‘Who Decides What
We Can Do With Our Body (and Brain)?’ 20 November 2016 <http://www.evidencebasedcryonics.org/
2016/11/20/statement/> accessed 2 December 2016.
62 R Huxtable, ‘Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity): A Right to Die or Is it Right to Die?’ (2002) 14 Child
and Family Law Quarterly 341.
63 Eg Re B (n 47).
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Jackson J therefore honoured JS’s subjective, autonomous wishes, and perhaps
with good reason. Judging by previous cases, an objective approach was arguably avail-
able to the court, which could have enabled Jackson J not to accede to JS’s wish.
Jackson J could, for example, have seized upon JS’s statement ‘I don’t want to be bur-
ied underground’,64 and taken this as evidence of her immaturity and incompetence.65
That he did not do so might signal that English law is warming to adolescent auton-
omy. We might query whether Jackson J’s determination ‘to remove the disadvantage
that JS is under as result of her age’ might come to extend to other contexts,66 such as
the refusal of life-saving treatment, a situation in which minors currently do not enjoy
the rights available to adults.67 We might even ponder whether Jackson J has opened
the door to patients’ demands. At present, no patient can make a demand for treat-
ment and expect that demand to be met, no matter how fanciful or ‘futile’ it appears.68
Admittedly, JS’s demand primarily takes effect after her death, so hers was not strictly
a demand for ‘treatment’. Nevertheless, in its effect, Jackson J’s decision arguably
aligns with others that appear to be chipping away at the prohibition on honouring
patients’ demands.69 But, regardless of the potential legal ramiﬁcations, the central
point remains: Jackson J appeared to have good reason for ﬁnding JS competent and
for deciding to honour her wish.
C. Autonomy and Identity
We can nevertheless still query whether JS’s desire should have carried the day. For
one thing, there are other interests in play (to which I will return). Moreover, retain-
ing the focus on JS’s autonomy, we can ask: why should an autonomous choice by the
living JS bind the deceased JS—and any future JS she might become, if reanimation
proves possible? Had JS lived and died ‘naturally’,70 then, leaving aside her prenatal
existence, there would be two signiﬁcant time-intervals to consider: the living, but ulti-
mately terminally ill, JS (living-JS) and the deceased JS (deceased-JS). But JS sought a
different life-course, which has three or four signiﬁcant time intervals: the living, but
terminally ill, JS (living-JS); the deceased but cryopreserved JS (cryon-JS); and the
reanimated JS who, let us assume, has been or will shortly be cured of her cancer
(reanimated-JS); reanimated-JS might later die (becoming deceased-JS), unless the sci-
ence has developed to enable life to be sustained indeﬁnitely. What entitles living-JS to
bind the future JS’s?
This is a question about precedent autonomy. In effect, JS has made a ‘living will’
and, strictly speaking, hers might be the ﬁrst such direction to have received formal
legal approval. That term, coined by Kutner in 1969, has fallen out of favour as a label
64 Re JS (n 1) [10].
65 See the court’s approach in eg Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386; Re M (A
Child) (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1999] 2 FLR 1097.
66 Re JS (n 1) [25].
67 See above (n 41).
68 Cf Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1992] 2 FLR 165; R (on the application of Burke) v General
Medical Council [2005] 3 WLR 1132.
69 Eg JC Youngs. Can the Courts Force the Doctor’s Hand? St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P [2015]
EWCOP 42. (2016) 24 Med Law Rev 99. Moreover, the decision competes with the rule that no one can
dictate what happens to their body after death.
70 An awkward, value-laden, term, but here referring to dying without cryopreservation.
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for advance medical directives, since a will only strictly applies after death.71 But the
term seems right in this speciﬁc context: JS is living and has made a will regarding fu-
ture medical intervention that is to apply after her death. Precedent autonomy is a
challenging enough notion in the contexts in which it is usually aired, such as when a
capacitous individual seeks to make an advance treatment decision for the incapaci-
tous individual he or she might become.72 The major philosophical challenge is one
of personal identity: is the drafter of the directive the same individual to whom it will
apply and, if not, what is the source of his or her authority for binding the future
entity?
Although subtler positions are available,73 ‘animalist’ and psychological accounts of
personal identity tend to dominate. In the former camp, animalists point to identity
enduring over time by virtue of a persisting body; in the latter, psychological connec-
tions are emphasized. Psychological accounts will struggle with advance decision-
making, but animalist accounts can entitle me to make provision for a future in which
I have mild dementia (in which, admittedly, I retain some psychological connection
to my pre-demented self), advanced dementia (in which the psychological connec-
tions appear much weaker), or am in a permanent vegetative state (in which I have
apparently lost higher brain function).74
However, in the case of cryonics, even an animalist account might struggle to ﬁnd
the relevant continuity. In the previous examples, the body persisted as a living entity.
In the future JS hoped for, she would be dead—although she could possibly (but only
possibly) thereafter be brought (back) to life. An animalist might therefore say that
there are qualitative differences between each of these three JS’s, such that there might
be three different JS’s to consider: the ﬁrst is living, with cancer; the second is replete
with cryopreservatives; the third is (presumably) cured of the cancer. Someone more
inclined to psychological connectedness as being constitutive of identity would cer-
tainly perceive a difference between living-JS and cryon-JS, and might be tempted to ar-
gue that reanimated-JS will be qualitatively (psychologically) affected by the journey
she has undergone.75
But these objections might not succeed. First, it could be countered that we already
empower people to extend their wishes beyond their deaths, through the ability to
make wills and indicate their wishes as to the disposal of their remains. Moreover,
71 L Kutner, ‘The Living Will: A Proposal’ (1969) 44 Indiana Law J 539.
72 R Huxtable, ‘Advance Decisions: Worth the Paper They Are (Not) Written On?’ (2015) 5 BMJ End of Life
doi:10.1136/eoljnl-2015-000002.
73 Eg AR Edgar, ‘The Challenge of Transplants to an Intersubjectively Established Sense of Personal
Identity’ (2009) 17 Health Care Analysis 123; A Campbell, ‘Why the Body Matters: Reﬂections on John
Harris’s Account of Organ Procurement’ in J Coggon, S Holm, S Chan and T Kushner (eds) From Reason
to Practice in Bioethics: An Anthology Dedicated to the Works of John Harris (Manchester University Press
2015) 131–141.
74 ‘Apparently’, because studies have suggested that some patients in the vegetative state may be able to follow
instructions (A Owen, MR Coleman, M Boly, MH Davis, S Laureys, and JD Pickard, ‘Detecting Awareness
in the Vegetative State’ (2006) 313 Science 1402).
75 This might be a ‘transformative experience’ that falls short of identity-interference (L Paul, Transformative
Experience (OUP 2014) 22). But the degree of psychological difference might mean a new identity is forged;
indeed, JS might even become trans-human by being enhanced in some way eg through nanotechnology
(OMMoen, ‘The Case for Cryonics’ (2015) J Med Ethics, doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-102715, 2).
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secondly, Shaw and Moen, who have independently written in support of decisions to
undergo cryonics, imply that JS does have the requisite authority, since reanimated-JS
is identiﬁably the same individual as living-JS. Shaw analogizes cryopreservation with
the provision of life-sustaining treatment: ‘in essence, successful cryonics would be a
form of life-support that delays, rather than returns the user from, death’.76 What he
assumes, but does not explicitly say, is that the identiﬁable individual known as JS will
persist over time, both as a physical and psychological entity, albeit with a cryonic
pause (reﬂected in the term ‘cryonic suspension’).
Moen tackles the identity point head-on, by analogy with those who undergo neu-
rosurgery or are revived after having drowned in cold water:
Since we know that cryopreservation can render ﬁne biological materials
(including neurons) intact, chances are good that it can also render intact the neu-
ral structures that encode personality, thoughts and memories. Even if we think
that neither particles nor patterns of particles are directly relevant to personal iden-
tity (perhaps we hold a psychological continuity theory or we believe in a soul), it
is unclear what more, on a physical, and thus medically relevant, level we can re-
quire for survival than the same particles being arranged in the same pattern.77
As such, for Moen and Shaw, an entity that is identiﬁable as JS can persist over time,
so, by extension, the living JS has the right to make decisions for the future cryopre-
served JS. Perhaps they have a point, otherwise we would have to concede, for exam-
ple, that anyone who has had cancer and successfully undergone treatment has
become a different person, either by virtue of the physical changes effected by the
treatment or by virtue of the experiences they have had. However, that only accounts
for the living-JS and reanimated-JS: cryon-JS remains to be understood. But maybe
there is no problem here either, otherwise those who have been successfully resusci-
tated would also have to be considered different people.
Whether JS has the authority to bind the future JS she might become nevertheless
remains a moot point, which I cannot seek to resolve here. Hopefully, however, I have
done enough to suggest that there are considerable philosophical complexities sur-
rounding Jackson J’s reasoning, which concern whose interests—and thus choices—
the court should have in view. The temporal point recurs, albeit in a different way,
when we move to another ethical school of thought that features in Jackson J’s ruling,
according to which an individual’s welfare rests on his or her happiness.
IV. IN THE INTERESTS OF JS’S HAPPINESS?
Although Jackson J placed substantial weight thereon, he did not only rely on JS’s
(subjective) wishes and feelings in reaching his decision, as he also had regard for ‘her
acute emotional needs’.78 As such, his reasoning was also informed by the hedonistic
theories to which Parﬁt referred, according to which a person’s welfare is determined
by his or her happiness. For its part, the hospital reportedly saw JS’s happiness as
76 D Shaw, ‘Cryoethics: Seeking Life After Death’ (2009) 23 Bioethics 515, 521.
77 Moen (n 75) 3.
78 Re JS (n 1) [46].
12 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwx045/4565569
by University Library user
on 18 December 2017
contingent on her desires being honoured. As Jackson J explained, ‘the hospital is will-
ing to do what it properly can to cooperate for the sake of JS, because the prospect of
her wishes being followed will reduce her agitation and distress about her impending
death’.79 On this account, JS’s desires inform, but are subordinate to, her happiness.
Whether or not Jackson J conceived of JS’s happiness in quite this way, he certainly
shared the hospital’s inclination to address JS’s ‘present distress’ and the need to
consider ‘JS’s welfare during life’.80
The temporal emphasis in Jackson J’s decision is notable: the judge appreciates that
his ruling is directed towards the future, which is precisely where JS is looking, but he
strives to locate his reasoning in the here-and-now, looking to JS’s interests as her life
nears its end. As with his emphasis on JS’s wishes, this is prima facie plausible and, in-
deed, humane. However, questions also arise here. Even if we are inclined to hold that
one identiﬁable JS persists over time, we might still wonder whether her interests will
vary over time and, if so, which interests at which point in time should take priority. In
short, Jackson J focuses upon the interests of living-JS but, if JS’s hopes for reanimation
come to be realized, then the interests of cryon-JS and reanimated-JS merit consideration.
Shaw and Moen implicitly recognize that interests can differ over time, but they con-
clude that, on balance, a prudential and an ethical case can be made for cryonics, with
each author knocking down various objections that can be levelled at the practice. Both
appear most inclined to a hedonist account of welfare. Hedonism is associated with con-
sequentialist, and speciﬁcally utilitarian, thinking, and Moen explicitly refers to the ‘util-
ity-value’ of cryonics.81 Shaw’s hedonistic leanings feature in his defence of the Cryonic
Wager, which is based on Pascal’s Wager. Pascal’s Wager, which is explicitly articulated
in terms of ‘happiness’,82 suggests that the possible beneﬁts of believing in God mean it
is worth doing so or attempting to do so. Shaw adopts this form of argument to defend
the Cryonic Wager: given the chance of reanimation, as opposed to the certainty of
obliteration, self-interest provides a reason for undergoing cryopreservation.
So what are the happiness gains that Shaw and Moen detect, and how do these re-
late to each interval of JS’s persistence over time? Starting chronologically with living-
JS, the authors believe the ﬁnancial costs associated with cryonics are not prohibitive
(and can be ameliorated via insurance), so prospective cryons should still be able to
‘live life to the full’.83 They say less about the interests of cryon-JS and deceased-JS, and
perhaps understandably so, as this would require them to enter into the murky realm
of posthumous interests.84 However, they do acknowledge a risk of reanimation not
occurring, perhaps because the technology never matures, the future State has ethical
objections to reanimation, the cryonics institute is bankrupted, or there is some cata-
clysmic event preventing reanimation. They nevertheless imply that, in such circum-
stances, cryon-JS is equivalent with deceased-JS, who—they further imply—has no
(or no relevant) interests, precisely because she is dead. Any money spent on
79 Ibid [13].
80 Ibid [36].
81 Moen (n 75) 2, 3.
82 See Shaw (n 76) 520.
83 Shaw (n 76) 516. Of course, JS’s young age is likely to have prevented her from accruing any savings and,
indeed, her costs were covered by her grandparents’ efforts to raise the funds.
84 See eg D Sperling, Posthumous Interests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2008).
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cryopreservation will not have been wasted because deceased-JS could not have used it
anyway and it was better to take the chance (however small) of successful reanima-
tion. Moen does then acknowledge the idea ‘that dying is good for us as individuals’,85
which implies it is better to be deceased-JS than cryon-JS. But not so, says Moen: medi-
cine is (rightly or wrongly) founded on the denial of death and, furthermore, it is not
necessarily the case that cryonics will lead to immortality.86
However, Moen and Shaw have most to say about the happiness of reanimated-JS, con-
cluding, in Moen’s words, that we might ‘expect postcryonic life to be tolerably good’.87
They argue, for example, that future technology might successfully repair damaged bodies
and that the reanimated individual need not be lonely as he or she could be joined by
loved ones and, in any case, new relationships can be forged. They also suspect that this
refugee ‘from another time’ will ﬁnd a place in their new society and might be welcomed
as a ‘living time capsule’.88 Moen cites Aristotle, who might happily ﬁt in if he were trans-
planted to our time and place, as he ‘would be deeply intrigued by contemporary science,
technology and philosophy, and . . . his life would be very much worth living’.89
Although they score some critical points, Moen and Shaw fail adequately to answer
some relational concerns about reanimated-JS, which have a bearing on her future hap-
piness. These concerns relate to her family (who will care for the reanimated person,
particularly if she is a minor?), future ﬁnances (how will the reanimated person sup-
port themselves?) and ﬁt (how comfortably will the reanimated person inhabit a fu-
ture society?). Regarding the latter, it is doubtful that the time-travelling Aristotle
entirely helps Moen. For a start, Aristotle might not want to time-travel: his renowned
work in ethics suggests a marked interest in others,90 but it is arguable that the cry-
onically inclined are more likely to have a marked self-interest. And even if he did
wish to travel to our time and place, Aristotle might not be a happy time-traveller, as
we are likely to baulk at his attitudes to women, slaves, foreigners, and pederasty.91
Moreover, it is still not entirely clear why or when the happiness of the future
reanimated person should outweigh the happiness of the currently living person. This
brings us back to JS’s situation and the sad post-script from Jackson J. On the one
hand, as the hospital noted, JS would gain some comfort as her life approached its
end from knowing that her wishes would be honoured. On the other hand, however,
there is evidence to suggest that her ﬁnal hours might not have been as ‘happy’ as
they could otherwise have been. We earlier saw how JS’s decision, as living-JS, at least
expressed her relational ties to her mother, which presumably made some positive
contribution to JS’s happiness. But Jackson J refers to evidence from the Trust, which
leaves the opposite impression: ‘On JS’s last day, her mother is said to have been
preoccupied with the post-mortem arrangements at the expense of being fully avail-
able to JS’.92 JS reportedly died peacefully, but apparently lacking her mother’s full
85 Moen (n 75) 4.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Shaw (n 76) 517, 519.
89 Moen (n 75) 3.
90 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.
91 Thanks to Genevieve Liveley for making this point.
92 Re JS (n 1) [68].
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engagement. We can only speculate, but it seems conceivable that this will have ad-
versely affected not only JS in her ﬁnal hours, but also her mother, both at that time
and as she grieves thereafter.
If JS’s gamble pays off, and Shaw and Moen are right, then perhaps such suffering
will have been worth it in the long-term, in view of JS’s future happiness gains. But
this is where the general problem arises: what weight should be accorded to one’s pre-
sent happiness, relative to one’s (potential) future happiness? This is a general prob-
lem for welfare calculations, and is one that is readily familiar from dilemmas around
the treatment and care of incapacitated individuals.93 A nursing home resident with
advanced dementia happily consumes meat at mealtimes, but their previous, capaci-
tous self was a longstanding vegan, who would have objected; which interests should
prevail?94 I will not seek to resolve this general problem here. I will, however, venture
to suggest that the case for cryonics is not entirely made out. Admittedly, hindsight
plays a part here, since the situation around JS’s demise only came to light after the
judge’s decision had been made (but before the judgment was published, wherein the
troubling post-script was added). It nevertheless reveals the possibility of some harm
coming to living-JS as a result of the decision to be cryopreserved. Cryonics arrange-
ments might improve, so future cryons could be able to avoid such problems. But the
problem of balancing current against future interests will persist, as the future beneﬁts
to the reanimated person remain speculative and not all of the relevant objections can
be dismissed.
V. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
In addition to the temporal dilemmas associated with the current and future interests
of individual patients, questions arise about whose interests should be in issue, whether
current or future. We have seen how there might be different JS’s to consider and the
interests of JS’s family, in particular her mother, have also come into view, but there
are others to consider, including the medical staff and, indeed, society at large.
Decisions in medical law are empowered and constrained by such public interest con-
siderations: the public interest may be invoked in order to promote or prohibit a par-
ticular course, in view of its assumed beneﬁts or harms, respectively.95 The subjects of
the relevant beneﬁts or harms will vary: sometimes the public interest is invoked on
my behalf, sometimes yours, and sometimes ours collectively.96
Even in the individual case, the judges will be mindful of the wider ramiﬁcations of
their decisions, given, for example, the operation of the doctrine of precedent.97
93 Note that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 4(6) requires reference to the incapacitated patient’s ‘past and
present wishes and feelings’ (emphasis added) when determining their best interests.
94 I am indebted to Mikey Dunn for this example.
95 R Huxtable, ‘Autonomy, Best Interests and the Public Interest: Treatment, Non-treatment and the Values
of Medical Law’ (2014) 22 Medical Law Review 459.
96 Ibid; RE Ashcroft, ‘From Public Interest to Political Justice’ (2004) 13 Camb Q Healthc Ethic 20.
97 Jackson J denies he is setting a precedent (Re JS (n 1) [28]). Similar claims have been made before (eg Re
A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001] Fam 147, per Ward LJ, 204-205). However, this
is a problematic assertion: if a case akin to JS’s were to arise in this jurisdiction, it is difﬁcult to see how the
same principles could not apply to the same effect. The ruling might even extend beyond cryonics, given
some of the judicial creativity on show. Jackson J manages to avoid (perhaps subvert) existing rules which,
for example, prevent minors from appointing executors and prevent patients from dictating their future
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Moreover, law has an expressive function, not only expressing values from society, but
also expressing values to society.98 The precise public interest considerations the
judges have in mind are seldom spelt out, although those mentioned in medico-legal
cases include the interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, maintaining the integ-
rity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties.99 These factors
were cited in the aforementioned Californian case, in which the court rejected a re-
quest for pre-mortem cryopreservation,100 and have also been cited in an English
case, concerning a prisoner’s objection to being force-fed.101 Jackson J did not overtly
cite such factors in his decision, but he was clearly mindful of the potential implica-
tions of his decision, having in view the interests of third parties and the integrity of
the professionals caring for JS. Of course, Jackson J was required to treat JS’s welfare
as his ‘paramount consideration’.102 Despite this emphasis, others’ interests have crept
into welfare assessments,103 and Jackson J recognized that his ruling would have an
impact beyond JS. He noted, for example, that ‘This situation gives rise to serious legal
and ethical issues for the hospital trust, which has to act within the law and has duties
to its other patients and to its staff’.104 However, he perceived no external obstacle to
him ruling in JS’s favour, as the Trust, the American authorities, JS’s social worker,
and the funeral directors were prepared to make the necessary arrangements.105
Jackson J felt able to rule in JS’s favour but the question arises whether the wider
impacts of the decision are such that he should not have done so. In short, should in-
dividuals like JS be at liberty to choose cryonics or should a prohibitive public interest
boundary be erected and enforced? In order to ascertain where the public interest lies,
Held suggests we can look to preponderance (or aggregative) theories (which focus on
desire-fulﬁlment), common interest theories (which promote that which we all have in
common), and unitary theories (which favour objective accounts of welfare).106
A. Preponderance Theories
Preponderance theories of the public interest, explains McHarg,
start from a subjective deﬁnition of interests, whereby individuals are seen as the
best judges of their own interests, the most reliable evidence of which is their
treatment (although, admittedly, cryopreservation is not strictly ‘treatment’). He also takes a far from literal
interpretation of s 62 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The provision empowers the court ‘to appoint as ad-
ministrator some person other’ than those who would otherwise have had that power, which in this case
would be JS’s parents. Jackson J interprets this as entitling him to remove JS’s father.
98 C Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021.
99 Thor v Superior Court (1993) 855 P2d 375 (Supreme Court of California).
100 Donaldson v Van de Kamp 4Cal Rptr 2d 59 (Cal Ct App 1992).
101 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127.
102 Children Act 1989, s 1(1).
103 For a prominent (albeit outlying) example, see: Re T (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 All
ER 906.
104 Re JS (n 1) [12].
105 Ibid [13], [17]–[19]. Jackson J did, however, insist that he was not making orders against third parties (Ibid
[27]). Whether that is an accurate depiction is open to question: the judge was explicitly making orders
against JS’s father (and his family) and surely, in effect, the ruling also required the compliance of third par-
ties, such as the hospital staff.
106 V Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970).
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revealed preferences. Accordingly, the public interest has no independent con-
tent, but is discovered simply by aggregating individual interests; that which is in
the interest of a preponderance of individuals is also in the public interest.107
Respect for autonomy may be the simplest argument in favour of permitting cryon-
ics,108 but preponderance theories demand respect not for individual choices as such,
but for the choices of the majority. The present dearth of cryons implies that the major-
ity has made its choice. At the time of writing, there are only 352 cryons worldwide:
ALCOR preserves 148 cryons,109 while the Cryonics Institute has 145,110 KrioRus has
51,111 Oregon Cryonics has 5,112 and Trans Times has 3.113 Even if the members of
these organizations—who we might presume will later become cryons—are accounted
for, we are still talking about only a few thousand cryons worldwide in the near future.
According to preponderance theories, if this reluctance to be cryopreserved reveals the
will of the people, then cryonics is apparently not in the public interest.114
This might be a stretch too far, however. First, it is not obvious that people have
made autonomous decisions about cryonics; perhaps few even know that cryopreser-
vation facilities exist. Secondly, even if people have autonomously decided not to opt
for this for themselves, this need not mean that they wish to deny this option to others.
Thirdly, this whole approach to the public interest risks suppressing the rights and in-
terests of the minority:115
The minority view held by those wishing to undergo cryonic suspension cer-
tainly may be characterized as unpopular, but this should not mean that dece-
dents who believe in cryonics and the prospect of reanimation do not deserve
the legal right to choose what happens to their bodies upon their death.116
107 A McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal
Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 Mod LR 671, 674–
675.
108 N Bhatia and J Savulescu, ‘Cryonics: Is Freezing Bodies All Hype, Hope, or is it just Logistical and Ethical
Hell?’ The Conversation (23 November 2016) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-24/cryonics-hype-
hope-or-hell/8050278> accessed 5 December 2016.
109 Alcor, ‘Alcor Membership Statistics’ <https://www.alcor.org/AboutAlcor/membershipstats.html> ac-
cessed 5 December 2016.
110 Cryonics Institute, ‘Cryonics Institute Member Statistics Details’ <http://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/
member-statistics/> accessed 5 December 2016.
111 KrioRus,<http://www.kriorus.com/en> accessed 5 December 2016.
112 Oregon Cryonics, ‘Cases’<http://www.oregoncryo.com/caseReports.html> accessed 5 December 2016.
113 J Palomino, ‘Cryonics ﬁrm sees market in tech’s quest for eternal youth’ SF Gate (17 July 2015) <http://
www.sfgate.com/business/article/Cryonics-ﬁrm-sees-market-in-tech-s-quest-for-6391836.php > accessed 5
December 2016.
114 On attitudes to cryonics, see the modest study in: WS Badger, ‘An Exploratory Survey Examining the
Familiarity with and Attitudes toward Cryonic Preservation’ (1998) 3 Journal of Evolution and Technology
<http://www.jetpress.org/volume3/badger.htm> accessed 4 December 2016. Badger notes that, of those
surveyed, men, younger people, and those without religious faith tended to have more positive attitudes to-
wards cryonics than women, those over 25 and theists respectively; women tended to be more concerned
about the reanimated person’s future lack of family, as were those who were married (as opposed to single
individuals).
115 McHarg (n 107).
116 Perlin (n 6) 58.
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We have seen the high value placed on subjective understandings of personal auton-
omy and liberty, including in Jackson J’s ruling, and perhaps it is indeed questionable
whether the wishes of the minority should be sacriﬁced in the way that preponderance
theories might indicate. The most that can be said here is that the majority of people
currently do not want to be cryopreserved, presumably because they are pessimistic
about cryonics’ prospects. This does not tell us enough yet about whether individuals
should be at liberty to make this choice.
B. The Common Interest
An alternative way of viewing the public interest(s) at stake involves looking to the
common interest, which encompasses those ‘interests which all members of the public
have in common, hence comprising a category of interests distinct from those of par-
ticular individuals or groups’.117 On this account, ‘if the relevant beneﬁts are to be pro-
vided for one person, they must inevitably be provided for all’.118 Here, important
public interests come into view, as cryonics appears to threaten the common interest,
since the (assumed) beneﬁt is unjustly distributed and the practice jeopardizes our
shared world.
First, even if we assume that cryonics does offer a beneﬁt, it is a beneﬁt only avail-
able to the wealthy. As an illustration, lifetime members of the Cryonics Institute can
expect to pay a membership fee of $1,250, plus $28,000 for cryopreservation; standby
and transfer costs then total $88,000 for such members, and there are likely to be ad-
ditional costs associated with (for example) the services of funeral directors.119
Cheaper options are available (for example, preservation of only one’s head)120 and
costs can be spread through insurance.121 However, one can still object that not every-
one—even in the developed world—will be capable of meeting the necessary insur-
ance premiums.
State provision for all would appear to provide an answer to this objection. The
case for such provision might mount, at least if or when cryonics approaches viability.
At present, however, the science is so speculative that this does not appear to be a
worthwhile use of the public purse. As such, at least at the present time, cryonics ap-
pears best left as a private matter, for those optimistic—some would say deluded –
few who are willing to make the investment. Shaw suggests that people should be at
liberty to make this choice, since their choice only involves a failure of altruism, as it
prevents the money being spent on charitable ends and deprives the world of (already
scarce) organs available for transplant.122
117 McHarg (n 107) 676.
118 Ibid 677.
119 Cryonics Institute, ‘Funding for Cryostasis’ <http://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/funding-for-cryostasis/>
accessed 5 December 2016.
120 Eg Alcor offers whole body cryopreservation for $200,000, while head preservation (‘neurocryoperserva-
tion’) costs $80,000: Alcor, ‘Alcor Cryopreservation Agreement: Schedule A’ <http://www.alcor.org/
BecomeMember/scheduleA.html> accessed 5 December 2016.
121 Shaw (n 76) 516.
122 Ibid 518. This point about altruism and organs raises a different difﬁculty with the ruling. The ruling effec-
tively overrode the wishes of JS’s father. We might query whether that would have been the outcome, had
JS instead been seeking to donate her organs after death. Although, under the Human Tissue Act 2004 s
2(7), only one parental consent would have sufﬁced, it is known that—in practice—an objection from a
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But, as JS’s case illustrates, cryonics can involve public, as well as private, goods. In
order to comply with Jackson J’s ruling, the NHS Trust and staff were required to de-
vote resources to effecting JS’s wishes, presumably at some cost to the care of other
patients. Maybe this would be less of a concern in a private treatment setting, but that
was not the case with JS, so the common interest is evidently engaged.
Assuming that the common interest is engaged, there may be a case for regulation,
as some have proposed.123 Jackson J acknowledged this, in view of concerns about the
practices of the ‘under-equipped and disorganised’ voluntary organization arranging
JS’s preservation,124 as well as ‘possible public health concerns and the position of the
coroner’.125 He approved the Trust’s plan to forward information about JS’s case to
the Human Tissue Authority,126 and wondered if cryonics might be brought within
the Authority’s purview ‘if it is to happen in future’.127 There may be a case for regula-
tion (for example, setting standards for the relevant organizations) if this could be ef-
fected swiftly and inexpensively. But, as with state provision, it can be queried
whether regulation is needed at this point in time, as the numbers of actual and poten-
tial cryons do not appear to warrant such effort or expense. As Jackson J’s ruling at-
tests, the law arguably already has sufﬁcient tools with which to muddle along, at least
until cryonics becomes more widespread.128
The second objection, in terms of the common interest, is that cryonics threatens
our shared world, and accordingly jeopardizes the resources we share in common.
Over-population—and the strains this places on the planet’s resources—is one con-
cern, although Moen argues that the burdens can be alleviated, for example through
taxation.129 But there is also the environmental burden to consider. This objection is
already levelled at traditional forms of disposal, such as cremation and burial, prompt-
ing efforts to promote greener alternatives.130 Shaw thinks the parallel is unfair be-
cause, if it succeeds, cryonics is a form of preserving a life, rather than disposing of the
dead.131 But that is an inadequate riposte: the fact surely remains that
relative can operate as a bar on organ harvesting (eg NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Families saying no to do-
nation results in missed transplant opportunities for UK patients’ (15 January 2016) <http://www.nhsbt.
nhs.uk/news-and-media/news-articles/news_2016_01_15.asp > accessed 5 December 2016). Certainly, in
a case like JS’s, in which mother and daughter are close, we might hope that her mother’s wishes about do-
nation, in conjunction with her own, would direct the ﬁnal decision. However, it is conceivable that her fa-
ther’s scepticism might be heeded. This suggests something of a tension: an altruistic bequest of organs is
capable of being overridden by a loved one, while a more self-interested decision to be cryopreserved was
not. Thanks to Genevieve Liveley for suggesting that I explore this apparent tension.
123 See eg Spector (n 5) 357; Smith (n 21); Bhatia and Savulescu (n 108).
124 Re JS (n 1) [68].
125 Ibid [15].
126 Ibid [69].
127 Ibid.
128 Cf GP Smith II, ‘The IcePerson Cometh: Cryonics, Law and Medicine’ (1983) 1 Health Matrix 23, 31. It is
possible that a tipping point will be reached at which the need for speciﬁc regulation would outweigh the
costs of taking such action. That point might be reached, for example, if the legal ﬂoodgates are opened and
future claims mount up, to which there are inadequate existing legal answers. For his part, Jackson J noted
that future cases like JS’s might arise, but he felt that the courts were equipped to ﬁlter out groundless ac-
tions (Re J (n 1) [37]).
129 Moen (n 75) 4.
130 Shaw (n 76) 518.
131 Ibid.
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cryopreservation, which might occur over centuries, will be bad for an already ailing
world. Presumably Shaw judges the beneﬁts to outweigh the harms, but he tends to
see the beneﬁts accruing to the reanimated, and does not explain why their interests
should take precedence over the interests of the planet and its other inhabitants, so
the objection persists.
C. Unitary Theories
The case for caution over cryonics gains ground when we turn to unitary theories. These
see the public interest as consisting in the protection or promotion of objective goods,
‘whereby a person or group’s interests are derived from a theory about what they ideally
ought to want or what is good for them, rather than from their subjective preferences’.132
On this account, cryonics will be contrary to the public interest if it involves valuing the
wrong things. Here, two concerns arise, around the value of death (and the merits of cer-
tainty about when death has occurred), and the value of science (and its advancement).
First, cryonics seems to threaten not only the fact that we will die (if, that is, it ulti-
mately leads to immorality), but also when we can say that someone is dead. There
may be value in death; indeed, perhaps we have a duty to die, after having had a ‘fair
innings’ of some or other duration.133 Whatever the merits of that argument, there
will certainly be value in knowing when death has occurred. Cryonics is currently only
lawfully available after death, as we currently understand it, has occurred.134 Cryon-JS
is therefore dead—but, if the procedure delivers, reanimated-JS will be dead no more.
This challenges our understanding of death as something irreversible, from which we
cannot return. That challenge might be overcome if pre-mortem cryonics—i.e.
‘mercy-freezing’—were to be permitted.135 An analogy with life-support seems plausi-
ble: the law could signal that the cryon is ‘suspended’ and has not died. Shaw, how-
ever, wants to go further and hold that cryopreserving (then reanimating) the
deceased is also analogous to life-support.136 For this analogy to succeed, we would
need to revise our existing deﬁnition of death. Both Shaw and Moen appreciate
this,137 and they favour a concept of ‘information-theoretical death’, i.e. ‘death occurs
when the neural structures that encode personality, thoughts, memories, etc, are dam-
aged to such an extent that restoration is in principle impossible’.138
132 McHarg (n 107) 675.
133 Bhatia and Savulescu (n 108). Cf J Hardwig, ‘Is There a Duty to Die?’ (1997) 27 The Hastings Center
Report 34.
134 See eg Alcor, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Can Alcor Cryopreserve me Prior to Legal Death?’ <https://
www.alcor.org/FAQs/faq06.html#death> accessed 5 December 2016; Donaldson v Van de Kamp 4Cal
Rptr 2d 59 (Cal Ct App 1992); JP Laboufft, ‘“He Wants To Do What?” Cryonics: Issues in Questionable
Medicine and Self-Determination’ (1992) 8 Computer & High Technology Law Journal 469; RW Pommer
III, ‘Donaldson v Van de Kamp: Cryonics, Assisted Suicide, and the Challenges of Medical Science’ (1993)
9 Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy 589. Cf R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1
FLR 268; R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) v
The Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38.
135 C Henderson and RCW Ettinger, ‘Cryonic Suspension and the Law’ (1967–1968) 15 UCLA Law Review
414, 418.
136 Shaw (n 76) 517.
137 See also C Cohen, ‘Bioethicists must Rethink the Concept of Death: The Idea of Brain Death is not
Appropriate for Cryopreservation’ (2012) 67 Clinics 93.
138 Moen (n 75) 1–2.
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Our current deﬁnition of death is already under attack, both by those who want to
expand the deﬁnition (for example, to include as dead those who have lost higher
brain function, which might increase the pool of available organ donors),139 and by
those who seek to restrict it (for example, families who seek continued treatment and
care for their brain dead loved ones).140 Cryonics presents fresh challenges, since it
threatens to destabilize existing deﬁnitions and confuse the various sequelae of death.
Admittedly, the current legal deﬁnition of death does permit of evolution, since it is
tethered to medical deﬁnitions, which change over time.141 Cryonics, however, invites
more than evolution: it necessitates a radical redeﬁnition. Such redeﬁnition is not un-
precedented: the dominant contemporary focus on brain-stem, rather than circula-
tory, death followed on from developments in organ transplantation.142 Despite this,
it would be premature to accept cryonics’ invitation at present, given the current state
of the science. If the science progresses and the case for redeﬁnition mounts, then var-
ious practical and legal arrangements following on from death would also need to be
considered. Ettinger, the early pioneer of cryonics, recognized that complex questions
would arise, ranging from matrimonial matters (particularly if there are multiple for-
mer spouses or civil partners) to ﬁnancial matters (around estates, life insurance and
tax liability).143 As Smith says, we need certainty on such matters: ‘Failure to recog-
nise death as death would play havoc not only with the law of property and succes-
sion, but act to destabilise the very social and religious fabric of society’.144
The second objective value points to medical science and the need for its advance-
ment. The law certainly recognizes this value: despite fears to the contrary,145 the
courts are already prepared to accommodate innovation, by authorizing experimental
procedures in the best interests of patients. For example, in Simms,146 the High Court
approved the use of experimental drugs to treat two incapacitated patients with
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD), while in J, it authorized a short trial of a sleeping
pill, Zolpidem, for a patient in a permanent vegetative state.147 Despite such accom-
modation, the courts are also keen to assert that not just any old (or new) science will
make the grade. In the law of negligence, the judges have re-asserted their authority to
assess the logical defensibility of the medical opinion they encounter in the court-
room.148 The judges have also scrutinized scientiﬁc evidence in cases, like JS’s, that
139 Eg P Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (St Martin’s Press 1994).
140 Eg LO Gostin, ‘Legal and Ethical Responsibilities Following Brain Death: The McMath and Mu~noz
Cases’ (2014) 311 JAMA 903; JE Troyer, ‘Deﬁning Personhood to Death’, in L Hagger and S Woods (eds)
A Good Death? Law and Ethics in Practice (Ashgate 2013) 41–54.
141 See Re A (A Minor) [1992] 3 Med LR 303. The current medical guidance is: Academy of Medical Royal
Colleges, A Code of Practice for the Diagnosis and Conﬁrmation of Death (Academy of Medical Royal
Colleges 2008).
142 See eg RM Sade, ‘Brain Death, Cardiac Death, and the Dead Donor Rule’ (2011) 107 Journal of the South
Carolina Medical Association 146.
143 Henderson and Ettinger (n 135). See also Spector (n 5).
144 Smith (n 21) 130.
145 See: J Miola, ‘Bye-bye Bolitho? The Curious Case of the Medical Innovation Bill’ (2015) Medical Law
International doi:10.1177/0968533215605667.
146 Simms v Simms and An NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 2734.
147 B NHS Trust v J [2006] EWHC 3152.
148 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.
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involve the welfare of young persons. In Re C,149 the Court of Appeal upheld a ruling
authorizing the immunization of two girls (including with the controversial MMR vac-
cine), contrary to the wishes of their mothers, with whom they resided, and in line
with the wishes of their fathers. Thorpe LJ noted that the rival expert opinions ‘were
of unusually unequal force’,150 with Sedley LJ going so far as to dismiss the evidence
cited on the mothers’ behalf as ‘junk science’.151
Although the cases have obvious differences, the precedent in Re C potentially of-
fered Jackson J the opportunity to similarly side with a sceptical, estranged father in
Re JS. Like JS’s father, Jackson J certainly had his misgivings about the evidence for
cryonics: ‘The scientiﬁc theory underlying cryonics is speculative and controversial’.152
However, he chose not to pursue the Re C route, and he focused not on the (de)mer-
its of cryonics, but on JS’s interests now, and the comfort she might take from having
her wishes honoured. His ruling might nevertheless have offered some tacit support
to cryonics. As I noted earlier, by not barring JS’s choice, Jackson J might have nudged
open the door towards honouring patients’ demands for unproven—arguably ‘fu-
tile’—procedures. Such demands need not be met at present,153 although the courts
are increasingly seeing futility as a matter to be judged by patients.154 Halliday has
suggested that the offer of ‘futile’ procedures can serve to promote other values, such
as the value of hope.155 JS evidently took some comfort from the possibilities of cry-
onics—but was this cold comfort, offering false hope? Perhaps it is in the public inter-
est to draw a line prohibiting that which can only offer false hope to the vulnerable. If
so, cryonics, and by extension Jackson J’s decision, potentially oversteps such a line.
Yet, drawing the line will be difﬁcult: on which side, for example, should the prom-
ises of religious or spiritual leaders fall?156 Defending too hard a line could also cause
science to stagnate, thereby depriving future patients of future innovations, however
inconceivable these are presently. Equally, however, the promises of future science
should be balanced against the needs of present patients. New developments—in hu-
man enhancement, life-extension, personalized medicine and the like—attract atten-
tion and, indeed, funding,157 but in the here-and-now resources are stretched and
everyday healthcare dilemmas—for example, involving ageing populations—per-
sist.158 Perhaps these current problems should be prioritized and cryonics de-
prioritized, although Shaw would doubtless reply that cryonics is privately funded, so
investment therein is at most a failure of altruism. This is persuasive, but more work is
149 Re C (A Child)(Immunisation: Parental Rights) [2003] EWCA Civ 1148.
150 Ibid [24].
151 Ibid [36].
152 Re JS (n 1) [7]; cf [30], [31].
153 See (n 68) and the recent, widely-publicised, case of Charlie Gard: Re Gard (A Child) [2017] EWHC 1909
(Fam).
154 See eg Aintree (n 38).
155 R Halliday, ‘Medical Futility and the Social Context’ (1997) 23 Journal of Medical Ethics 148.
156 Bhatia and Savulescu (n 108).
157 Eg CA Gericke, A Riesberg and R Busse, ‘Ethical Issues in Funding Orphan Drug Research and
Development’ (2005) 31 J Med Ethics 164.
158 Eg G Birchley, K Jones, R Huxtable, J Dixon, J Kitzinger and L Clare, ‘Dying Well with Reduced Agency: A
Scoping Review and Thematic Synthesis of the Decision-Making Process in Dementia, Traumatic Brain
Injury and Frailty’ (2016) 17 BMCMedical Ethics, doi: 10.1186/s12910-016-0129-x.
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undoubtedly needed to ascertain where the balance should be struck between all of
the different interests at stake, both present and future.
VI . CONCLUSION
Writing about cryonics in 1967, Henderson and Ettinger opined: ‘any pessimism
whatever, on any score, is grotesquely premature. We have scarcely begun to live and
learn’.159 Five decades on, reanimation of a cryon still seems a long way off, but cryon-
icists continue to take the long view: Alcor believes that ‘medical technology will ad-
vance further in coming decades than it has in the past several centuries, enabling it to
heal damage at the cellular and molecular levels and to restore full physical and mental
health’.160 Contemporary cryonicists would presumably endorse Henderson and
Ettinger’s view that cryonics is ethically defensible:
What parent would hesitate to save a child’s life, merely because the child might
later be unhappy, or might later crowd someone? Likewise, in medical ethics, it
is the life of the patient that counts, and not the welfare of other individuals or
of society.161
I have suggested, however, that there are important countervailing considerations,
which relate both to the interests of the person undergoing cryonics—JS in our
case—and the interests of others, including the wider society and, indeed, the planet.
Starting with the individual seeking cryopreservation, Jackson J rested his decision
on JS’s autonomous wish for cryopreservation. As such, he did not let objective consid-
erations about the possible wrongfulness of JS’s choice prevent him from honouring
that choice, although his decision can be read as advancing another objective good, in
preserving the relationship between JS and her mother. Generally, however, Jackson J
followed the dominant legal approach, thereby conceiving of autonomy in subjective
terms and ﬁnding JS sufﬁciently intelligent and informed to take the decision to be cryo-
preserved. Although his reasoning is hard to fault, we can nevertheless ask what it is that
entitles and empowers the dying JS to legislate for the future reanimated-JS she might
become—assuming, that is, the science can ultimately deliver that which she sought.
Temporal questions also arise if we look at JS’s welfare in a different sense, this
time understood in terms of her happiness. Whether or not the dying-JS, the cryon-JS
and the reanimated-JS remain identiﬁably the same person, it is apparent that JS’s in-
terests can differ at different points in time. Some scholars maintain that the reani-
mated person can be happy and that cryopreservation is a better gamble than certain
death. However, their case is not yet complete: relational concerns still linger, particu-
larly around the reanimated person’s family, ﬁnances, and ﬁt in the future. Whether or
when such future interests should supersede the present interests of the dying individ-
ual also remains to be seen. This point was poignantly illustrated in JS’s case, given ev-
idence of her mother’s preoccupation with the cryonics arrangements at the time of
JS’s demise.
159 Henderson and Ettinger (n 135) 419.
160 Alcor<http://www.alcor.org/> accessed 2 December 2016.
161 Henderson and Ettinger (n 135) 419.
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Finally, it is not only the interests of the prospective cryon, or even those of their
close family, that are relevant, since there are public interests at stake. The preponder-
ance view of the public interest—which looks to what the majority of people want—
admittedly adds little, since we should not draw ﬁrm conclusions about what the ma-
jority would support from the mere fact that very few people have elected for cryo-
preservation. But the common interest—which seeks to fairly promote that which we
have in common—does usefully highlight the fact that cryonics appears (unjustly) to
be the preserve of the wealthy. In response, the state could seek to make cryonics
available to everyone, but the speculative state of the science suggests that state invest-
ment would currently be an inappropriate use of public resources. For the same rea-
son, (potentially costly) regulation is probably not yet indicated. Maybe, then,
cryonics should remain a private matter, even if the money is better spent on other
causes. But, even then, there will still be common interests to consider, not least the
environmental burden imposed by cryonics.
There are also relevant objective, unitary interests, concerning the value of death
and the value of science. First, cryonics threatens the assumption that death is irrevers-
ible and would, if the science advances, require us to revisit the deﬁnition of death
and the various rules associated with its occurrence. The case for doing so might
mount, but is not yet made out. Secondly, there is a balance to be struck between
meeting society’s current needs and enabling science to ﬂourish. By deciding in JS’s fa-
vour, Jackson J’s decision tacitly favours the latter. Cryonics may yet deliver on JS’s
hopes but, as things stand, it might at worst only offer false hope; if so, this is arguably
not a position that the law should be endorsing.
In sum, this ruling raises thorny questions about the interests at stake in a decision
to undergo cryonics. Further work is invited,162 including on the nature of ‘welfare’ and
the ‘public interest’, and particularly, on the balance to be struck between current and fu-
ture interests, and between the public interest and individuals’ interests. As JS’s case
demonstrates, these are not merely abstract matters. Hopefully others will take up the
challenge of articulating an account of interests that does justice to the different interests
at stake, and to the different holders of these interests, both now and in the future.
162 Cf Moen (n 75) 1.
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